Το ημερολόγιο έδειχνε Πέντε του Δεκέμβρη, το έτος 2024, εσπερινός του Αγίου Νικολάου στον ομώνυμο ναό στον Λυκαβηττό. Πώς περνά ο καιρός, πάει ένας ολόκληρος χρόνος … Συνάμα με τες ευχές μου για την ονομαστική του εορτή ενεχειρώ  στο Νίκο της διαρκούσης Προεδρίας ένα προσωπικό εμπιστευτικό υπόμνημα. Περί εξωτερικής πολιτικής. Αναφέρομαι σε ανέξοδους τρόπους ενίσχυσης του διεθνούς κύρους της κολοβής μας δημοκρατίας κτίζοντας σε διεθνείς πρωτοβουλίες της ανένταχτης – κομματικώς ομιλούντες – ταπεινότητας μου. Ένα κράτος κολοβό, όχι μόνο λόγω Τουρκικής κατοχής στον βορρά και Βρετανικής επικυριαρχίας στο νότο αλλά επιπροσθέτως από την αβελτηρία των ταγών αυτής. Ο Νίκος μού χαμογελά και ευχαριστεί.

Μια κουτσουλιά τόπος είμαστε. Πέντε μέρες αργότερα τον συναντώ εκ νέου στην διχοτομημένη πρωτεύουσα. Εκδήλωση διεθνούς κοινωνικού χαρακτήρα. Έχοντας γνώση της προτίμησης του στην αμεσότητα του ενικού και της πολύχρονης μας, αν και άκαρπης γνωριμίας – σίγουρα όχι λόγω δικής μου υπαιτιότητάς – χαιρετώ, ερωτώντας τον: «Νίκο τι θα πράξεις; Τα όσα σού προτείνω είναι προς δικό σου συμφέρον και του διεθνούς μας κύρους πάνω από όλα». Με ύφος απόλυτης σιγουριάς και εμπιστοσύνης μού απαντά κοφτά:

«Είπα του Κόμπου να σε δει…»

Επιτρέψτε μου να συνεχίσω την αφήγηση σε ύφος λαϊκό, κατ’ εικόνα και ομοίωση του Προεδρικού ύφους. Ο Κόμπος με … γκαστρώνει για ένα … εννιάμηνο. Η κύηση οδηγεί τελικά την συνάντηση μας στις 19 του Αυγούστου στο Υπουργείο. Παρατώ την επιστημοσύνη και την συγγραφή στη Βρετανική Βιβλιοθήκη (Λονδίνο, εννοείται) για χάρη της. Καταφθάνω στον ατημέλητο κήπο του κτιρίου του Υπουργείου. Ανεβαίνω με βάση το πρωτόκολλο στο γραφείο Υπουργού με συνοδεία νεαρού διπλωμάτη.

Το αποτέλεσμα της πολυπόθητης συνάντησης; Σκέτο … ανεμογκάστρι!

Πέραν της γλαφυρότητας και της χαριτολογημένης αφήγησης, η ουσία είναι πραγματικά δύσπεπτη. Ο Κόμπος φτάνει στο χτένι. Δεν θα ήταν δυνατό να κρατώ μέσα μου αυτόν τον Κόμπο … για χρόνια. Για να έχω ήσυχη την συνείδηση μου απέναντι στους ενενηντάχρονους γονείς, που με ανάθρεψαν με ιδανικά και αξίες, με σεβασμό στην πολυετή πορεία μου στα διεθνή ιδρύματα, κρίνω ότι οφείλω να εκθέσω σοβαρότατα ατοπήματα στην άσκηση εξωτερικής πολιτικής. Εξηγούμαι:

Βιέννη, Δεκέμβρης 2024. Οργανισμός για την Ασφάλεια και Συνεργασία στην Ευρώπη – ΟΑΣΕ.  Σύνοδος ΥΠΕΞ των συμμετεχόντων κρατών. Θέμα: Εκλογή νέου Γενικού Γραμματέα του Οργανισμού. Βαρύτατη η ευθύνη του Κωνσταντίνου Κόμπου: συναίνεσε αμαχητί στην εκλογή του Τούρκου βετεράνου διπλωμάτη Σινιρλίογλου στην κορυφή της ηγετικής πυραμίδας του μοναδικού πολυμερούς Ευρασιατικού Οργανισμού Ασφάλειας. Είναι η πρώτη φορά που εκλέγεται Τούρκος στην ηγεσία ΟΑΣΕ για τριετή θητεία. Με την σύμφωνο γνώμη του Κόμπου. Ο καθένας μπορεί να ανατρέξει στο διαδίκτυο και να μάθει ποιος είναι ο Feridun Sinirlioglu …

Χωρίς κανένα απολύτως αντάλλαγμα! Εκλογή του Τούρκου Εν Λευκώ!

Σε μια απέλπιδα προσπάθεια μου να λύσω τον επί χρόνια Άλυτο … Κόμπο υπέδειξα ότι είμαι εγκεκριμένος διαμεσολαβητής ΟΑΣΕ εδώ και μια δεκαετία, αποφοιτήσας της Διπλωματικής του Ακαδημίας προ εικοσαετίας (2003). Μολαταύτα ουδέποτε κλήθηκα σε αποστολή του Οργανισμού. Το γεγονός αυτό και μόνο οφείλεται στην ανεπάρκεια και αναποτελεσματικότητα του Υπουργείου των Εξω … φρενικών. Πού είναι το Γραφείο Προώθησης των Κυπρίων Ειδημόνων για Πρόσληψη στους Διεθνείς Οργανισμούς; Άλυτος Κόμπος! Πόσο μακριά θα φτάσεις με τους έξι άξονες της εξωτερικής πολιτικής; Και δεκάξι να ΄χεις αν δεν έχεις τους ανθρώπους σου στους διεθνείς οργανισμούς, πως θα ασκήσεις επιρροή; Εκατό τριάντα δύο εκατομμύρια ευρώ σού εγκρίνει η Βουλή για το Υπουργείο ετησίως, δεν μπορείς να διαθέσεις δύο, να παλέψεις τον διορισμό Κυπρίων προσοντούχων;

Αλλά είπαμε, χρόνια τώρα, συσκέψεις και συναντήσεις και ανεμογκάστρι! Υπέβαλα στο νεαρότερο Κωνσταντίνο Κόμπο ότι όφειλε στα πλαίσια της υπηρεσίας του προς αυτό το ημι-κατεχόμενο από την Τουρκία κράτος, να εξαργυρώσει τουλάχιστον την συναίνεση του στην εκλογή Σινιρλίογλου, με απτό αντάλλαγμα: την τοποθέτηση μου σε σημαίνουσα – τη βάσει προσόντων και αποφοίτησης της Διπλωματικής Ακαδημίας Βιέννης – θέση στη Γραμματεία ΟΑΣΕ, σφήνα στον Τούρκο διπλωμάτη. Εφόσον η συναίνεση του ήτο μονόδρομος, όπως διατεινόταν. Αυτό επέβαλλε η εξυπηρέτηση των Κυπριακών συμφερόντων. Αντ’ αυτού επέλεξε το μηδενικό για την Κύπρο αποτέλεσμα αφού η Άγκυρα μπλόκαρε την υποψηφιότητα του για την προεδρία του 2026 … Εύγε Άλυτε Κόμπε!

Είκοσι δύο χρόνια στην  αίθουσα αναμονής για μια θέση στον ΟΑΣΕ, κτίζω διεθνείς διασυνδέσεις για την Κύπρο μας  με έξοδα από την τσέπη μου. Σε διηπειρωτικές διαδρομές που με βρίσκουν από το Τόκιο μέχρι το Μπουένος Άιρες. Σε πέραν των εξήντα χωρών …

Ουδέν έπραξεν ο Κόμπος! Θέτοντας το σε πρώην υπουργό, μού  υπέδειξε με νόημα: Ουδείς πράττει ουδέν!

European and American museums are confronted by requests of the return of artifacts bought or seized by colonial powers: Greece Presses for the Return of the Parthenon Marbles to where they belong: Athens Acropolis.

Researchers still looking for the Amber Room, Tsarist treasure allegedly stolen by the Nazi occupation forces and presumably destroyed or still hidden somewhere in Germany.

In 2008 a scandal hit the world of archaeology in Spain as it was reported that supposedly ancient artifacts were faked. In time the scandal became connected to the attempts to strengthen a real or imaginary Basque nationalist past. This episode in Spanish archaeology history is a modern example of how archaeology has played a role in shaping modern national identities and the creation of national myths.[1] In the Spanish case, Basque nationalism rooted in a very ancient language was one of the sources of conflict in 20th century Spain. It contributed to fueling the Spanish civil war in the 1930s and terrorism in Spain after the transition from Franco’s dictatorship to a modern democracy. Only in 2017 ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna – Basque Country and Freedom)[2] finally stopped fighting the Spanish state. Paradoxically, the end of this violent Basque separatism was followed in Spain by a Catalan separatism and the attempt of some Catalan parties to declare independence by arguing for a separate identity that set apart the Catalonian region linguistically and culturally from mainstream Spanish history.

The archaeological background to modern nationalism and conflicts is not new. In fact, in the earlier part of the 19^th century the Greeks, with great European support and sympathy, fought against the Ottoman Empire for a political and cultural independence that was stimulated by a connection to Classical Greece and of course the Byzantine Empire. By 1870, the German archeologist Heinrich Schliemann had begun discovering Homer’s Troy. His findings and the discovery of artifacts connected to ancient Greece stimulated enthusiastic interest in the near-Eastern archaeological and historical heritage.[3][4] Streams of archaeological discoveries reshaped a new Hellenic identity that shaped Greek politics and the conflicts with the Ottoman Empire, conflicts that saw the catastrophic Greek-Turkish war of 1922 and decades later the conflict in Cyprus between the Greek majority and the Turkish minority.

In Cyprus, the destruction of Greek archaeological sites was one of the subjects of the Greek-Cypriot political stance against the occupation of northern Cyprus by thousands of Turkish soldiers following the 1974 invasion of the island, when Turkey claimed it was protecting the rights of the Turkish-speaking minority.[5] The invasion followed years of conflict in Cyprus, ruled for decades by the British from 1878 until 1960[6]. The ethnic conflict was resolved through a compromise where the Greek-Cypriot desire to be reunited with Greece was set aside by giving independence to the island along with a constitutional compromise between the two ethno-linguistic groups.

Modern archaeology and the new scientific disciplines associated with it have now come to create greater knowledge and insight into the past of many regions across the globe.  They have also fueled value systems and political ideologies that have now come to spread increasingly across regions and nations, serving to bolster the perennial search for power and meaning in an international system tied by new economic realities and social mobility that challenges older historical and religious traditions. Some intellectuals and critics have used the encounter of the West with the non-traditional world, especially Islamic in the Middle East, as an example of cultural colonialism above and beyond political and economic imperialism. A classic case of the debate on the subject was the systematic work of Edward Said who wrote extensively criticizing western scholarship as being unable to truly understand the East – especially the Middle East – in his work Orientalism. His approach was very influential in the academic world, and continues being so, though his understanding of the Western-European insights into the Middle East especially are methodologically unsound and ideologically biased.[7]

Thus, archaeology comes to have even greater relevance in the reformulation of many aspects of international relations and ideological and civilizational clashes.  It then becomes even more incumbent on academics at large, especially historians, archaeologists, and ethno-linguists to dispel whenever possible the constant mythologizing and distortion of historical and archaeological scholarship.[8] The Americas were not exempt from these trends.

Across the Atlantic the mystification of new archaeological and linguistic discoveries became a systematic component of local nationalism, particularly when studying pre-Columbian civilizations in Central and South American states and Native American tribes in the United States and Canada. In Mexico, the Aztec heritage boosted Indianismo, which came to be one of the pillars of the new regime in Mexico after the epic of revolution that shaped a new Mexico after 1912.  From the 1920s onwards, the official historiography of Mexico emphasized Aztec civilization which had been systematically studied since the 19^th century by Western archaeologists and denounced the Spanish conquest as an assault on some past noble human experiment.  The reformulation of a new Mexican identity saw even a revival of attempts to remove the bones of Hernán Cortés, the Spanish conquistador who had been entombed in Mexico City. By 2020, the Mexican government, run by a progressive leftist president was seeking official apologies from Spain for the Spanish Conquest of the Aztec Empire, and for the violence involved in the establishment of Spanish cultural hegemony in Mexico.[9]

The reinterpretation of the past by now had come to see in both North and South America the denunciation of Columbus and the arrival of the Europeans. In some respects, it was a reassertion of the Rousseauian paradigm of the Noble Savage being overwhelmed by civilization. In fact, the reaffirmation of aboriginal rights in North, South, and Central America from the Arctic Circle to Patagonia, in claims to land and resources came to be often articulated through archaeological discoveries and the assertion of the parity of native languages with Spanish as in Peru, Bolivia, Mexico, or Guatemala.

Even in Europe, the creation of a pan-European identity seemed to have enhanced the reaffirmation of ethno-linguistic ideologies rooted in mythical pasts given some superficial credibility by archaeology and linguistics. Examples range from the Dardanian movement in the Balkans following the independence of Kosovo as Albanians and Kosovars reiterated their European roots by linking to classical Greek history and mythology, including the destruction of Serbian Orthodox religious sites to the revival of Celtic religions and outright paganism professing a return to animism and Norse religions in Scandinavia. In the United States within the last generation there has been a revitalization of Neo-Pagan religion and witchcraft, ranging from the Church of Satan as an established institution to Wicca as a legitimate religious experience.[10] New political movements, ranging from neo-Scandinavian nationalism to neo-Nazism have connected their political ideology to Old Norse religious mythologies.[11]

These new phenomena tended to have a more strictly sociological significance and had yet to develop a political relevance. The age of instant electronic communication lent itself to the mystification of archaeology, ethnography, and linguistics from Europe and North America to the rest of the globe.  Fueled by misperceived scientific and academic research, science fiction, UFO sightings, political propaganda, mysticism, religion, eschatology, and catastrophism gave rise to a vast body of literature, movies, and internet-propagated debate and speculations grounded in the outright mystification of science and racialism intensifying and legitimizing national conflicts and political violence.

Their interpretation of the past through archaeological discoveries and political influence in terms of modern ideological postures characterizes every area of the world, ranging from Latin America to Australia and Africa. [12] European and American museums came to be confronted by requests of the return of artifacts bought or seized by colonial powers. The British museum, for example, was going to return the Benin bronzes to Nigeria.[13] The bronzes had been seized by British troops in 1897 during the British conquest of Benin. Benin today is in modern Nigeria, and part of the federal state.

The Greek Cause for the Parthenon Marbles Return to Athens

In modern Europe one of the more chronic problems in archaeological politics is the pressing demand of the Greek state for the repatriation of the Parthenon Marbles, also known as the Elgin Marbles, from the British Museum to Athens. The Marbles were part of the façade of the Acropolis of Athens and were allegedly purchased by Lord Elgin, the British Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire in 1807. The issue came up again following Brexit, as the Greek government pressed once again for the return of the Elgin Marbles.[14] The subject became part of the diplomatic bargaining between the United Kingdom and Brussels over the future of the political relationship between the European Union and London. The controversy has been going on for decades. In the same vein, stolen art from Italy is a subject of Italian international requests for return of what it considers to be Italian cultural patrimony.[15]

Last but not least, the Nazi German state’s looting of European art all over the occupied areas during World War II still stands out as an example of the role of war in the displacement of national art and culture. Researchers are still looking for the Amber Room, a Tsarist treasure allegedly stolen by the Nazi occupation forces and presumably destroyed or still hidden somewhere in Germany.[16]

Thus, one may conclude here by saying that symbolically archaeology goes beyond the mere study of the past through what remains of the past materially, but it also shapes how individuals and nations may see themselves in the modern age. As archaeological explorations expand, inevitably the reinterpretation of the past also takes place. This is especially relevant in the Middle East, which by many standards, is the birthplace of civilization. Arguably, the most important dimension of this past is a religious experience that has characterized the Middle East ever since the birth and evolution of Judaism, the rise of Christianity and the shaping of monotheistic belief systems.

Modern Re-Elaboration of Jewish Identity Through Rise of Zionism

Perhaps the most outstanding example is the modern re-elaboration of a Jewish identity through the rise of modern Zionism in 19^th century Europe and the creation of the modern state of Israel in 1947. In the 2^nd century AD, the Romans wiped out what had been a Jewish ethno-religious state in Judea along with the destruction of what had originally been the Temple of Solomon in 70 AD. Judea became a Roman province and hundreds of thousands of Jews were enslaved and deported throughout the Roman Empire, though the territory still held a considerable population of Jews.

Some decades later, in 132 AD the Jews rebelled again. This revolt saw Emperor Hadrian raze Jerusalem and rename it Aelia Capitolina. To add insult to injury, Judea came to be renamed Palestina with a reference to one of the peoples in the area, the Philistines mentioned in the Bible. From then to modern times, Palestine was a common name for a territory that eventually became the state of Israel and came to be seen by Jews scattered across the world as a land to return to with the coming of the Messiah. Herein lies an added Christian dimension to the religious and cultural relevance of the Jewish historical linkage to a lost state, to be restored with, by a coming Messiah for Jews and the second coming of Christ for all Christian denominations.

The rise of Islam in the 7^th century and the conquest of Jerusalem by the Muslims in southern Arabia added a third monotheistic appeal to the city of Jerusalem which came to have historical and cultural consequences for centuries for the people of the region, Europe, and in time for international relations from the 19^th century onwards. By the 18^th century, there was already a historical and archaeological interest in the Middle East and the biblical connection was the most relevant aspect of it. In the development of modern states in the Middle East, whether Turkey, Iran, Egypt, or as a matter of fact anywhere else in the world, reconstructing the past through archaeology and other disciplines such as linguistics was not a new phenomenon, and continues to be ever more relevant. Paradoxically, in an ever more globalized world, national identity becomes ever more relevant for domestic political purposes. The reconstruction of the past through archaeology to enhance modern national identity becomes ever more interesting in terms of ideological, economic, and international premises. Thus, tourism, education, propaganda, articulated through mass and social media come to stand out and add to an even greater dimension to the models developed in the theories of international relations and conflict.

[1] Ashley Cowie, “Archaeologist Busted for Faking Artifacts Showing Jesus Crucifixion,” in Ancient Origins, 8 February 2020. https://www.ancient-origins.net/news-history-archaeology/iru-veleia-artifacts-0013266

[2] Claude Canellas, Sonya Dowsett, and Isla Binnie, “Basque militants ETA surrender arms in end to decades of conflict” Reuters, April 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-eta-idUSKBN1790YK

[3] Caroline Moorehead, Priam’s Gold: Schliemann and the Lost Treasure of Troy (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2016).

[4] Robert Payne, The Gold of Troy: The Story of Heinrich Schliemann and the Buried Cities of Ancient Greece (Dorset: Dorset Press, 1990).

[5] Lefkios Zaphiriou, Costas Nicolaides, Miltos Miltiadou, Marianna Mammidou, Van Coufoudakis, “The Loss of a Civilization; Destruction of cultural heritage in occupied Cyprus” Government of Cyprus, 2012.

[6] For a Turkish perspective, see Ozmatyatli, I. O. & Ozkul, A. E. “20th Century British Colonialism in Cyprus

through Education.” (Egitim Arastirmalari-Eurasian Journal of Educational Research, 50, 1-20. 2013).

[7] Morris Mottale, “Book Review: Orientalism and Islam: European Thinkers on Oriental Despotism in the Middle East and India.” (Canadian Political Science Association, 2010).

[8] See Also: The MESA Debate, 22 November 1986. Cf: Robert D. Kaplan, “Remembering Elie Kedourie: How One Analyst Spoke Truth to Power in the Middle East.” (The National Interest, 25 April 2020)

[9] “Mexico demands apology from Spain and the Vatican over conquest.” (BBC, 26 March 2019). See Also, Renzo Pipoli “Spain denies Mexico apology over 1521 Spanish conquest.” (UPI, 26 March 2019)

[10] See for example Jessica Bennet “When Did Everybody Become a Witch?” (New York Times, 24 October 2019). See also; David Brooks “Commentary: Witchcraft enjoying a surge in popularity” (New York Times, 13 June 2019).

[11] Samuel Sigal “What To Do When Racists Try To Hijack Your Religion” (The Atlantic, November 2, 2017).

[12] Paul Daley “There’s a new push for the return of looted Aboriginal artefacts – in the name of ‘truth telling’.” (The Guardian, 1 December 2019). See Also; Geoff Gray “A Cautious Silence: The politics of Australian anthropology”. (Aboriginal Studies Press: August 1, 2007)

[13] Kieron Monks “British Museum to return Benin bronzes to Nigeria.” (CNN, 14 December 2018). See also: “The British Conquest of Benin and the Oba’s Return”, Art Institute of Chicago (2013).

[14] Ian Wishart “EU Brings Greek Demand for Elgin Marbles Into Brexit Talks.” (MSN, 19 February 2020).

[15] See for Example “Italian Court Orders Getty Museum To Return Statue To Italy”. (NPR, 5 December 2018).

[16] “Amber Room: Priceless Russian treasure stolen by Nazis ‘discovered by German researchers’” (The Independent, 19 October 2017).

Indicatively, total final energy consumption is forecast to double in Turkey by year 2050. This is the EnerOutlook forecast based on sustained economic development of emerging economies which takes into account the effect of global warming (such a scenario is compatible with a global temperature rise of between three to four degrees Celsius).

To address the problem of increasing domestic energy demand, Ankara has been actively pursuing nuclear energy to lessen its high dependency on energy imports. Consequently, in May 2010, Russia and Turkey signed a Cooperation Agreement, under which Rosatom State Cooperation has since been constructing the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant. This NPP will eventually contain four reactors with a combined capacity of 4800 MW. Other nuclear power projects in Sinop, Black Sea region and the Eastern Thrace region remain in the planning stages.

Construction of the Akkuyu NPP begun in December 2017. Its final cost is expected to rise over 20 billion USD – roughly equivalent to the size of Cyprus’ economic output in 2020. The first reactor is expected to become operational in 2023, the year that marks the centenary anniversary of the Republic of Turkey. No doubt, Erdogan’s government is planning festivities for this significant event, to boost its plunging popularity.

Despite serious concerns about the safety of the Akkuyu NPP, located as it is, in the high seismic activity region of Mersin, construction continuous. Every consecutive year in the following three years (2024-26) will see a new reactor coming into operation.

The first controversy over the impact of this huge nuclear power project on the environment appeared already six years ago: on 12 January 2015, it was reported that the signatures of specialists on a Turkish government-sanctioned environmental impact report had been forged. The appointed specialists had resigned six months prior to its submission, and the contracting company had then made unilateral changes to the report. Naturally so, this revelation sparked protest within the Turkish Cypriot community. The proximity of the prospective Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant to our island could not be lightheartedly ignored. This powerful NPP will operate at about 110 kms from Lefkosia. In the context of an unexpected nuclear accident caused by an earthquake or otherwise, North or South Cyprus becomes immaterial. A fatal nuclear accident carries the danger of overwhelming both parts of the island.

In this respect, it is vital that the leaderships of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots stand in unison: the Eastern Mediterranean environment and its protection is a common cause. More so as Ankara exhibits a mixed approach, to say the least, towards international legal instruments on nuclear safety: Whereas Turkey signed up to the Convention on Nuclear Safety which entered into force 24 October 1996, it has not done the same with the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management which entered into force 18 June 2001.

Two years back, in September 2019, Ankara first raised the issue of Kashmir at the United Nations General Assembly. What prompted Ankara to do so?

Since the British colonialists’ withdrawal and the partition of the Indian subcontinent in two states in 1947, part of Kashmir has stayed under Indian sovereignty. New Delhi had granted autonomy and a special status to the predominantly Muslim populated Kashmir. (In 2003, the percentage of Muslims in the Kashmir Valley was 95 percent and those of Hindus four percent). However, in August 2019, India passed a constitutional amendment revoking the special status and autonomy for Indian-administered Kashmir and absorbed it into the country’s governance mainstream. Since then, tensions with Pakistan remained high. (Note the parallel with Makarios’ failed attempt in 1963 to strip the Turkish Cypriot Muslim minority from its prerogatives through a raft of sweeping amendments of thirteen articles of the Republic of Cyprus constitution). Within a month after the Indians devested the Kashmiris of their autonomy, Ankara raises the issue at the foremost international forum.

Nine months later, on the 17^th of June 2020, the United Nations General Assembly elects Volkan Bozkir of Turkey, as President of its seventy-fifth session (Sep 2020 – Sep 2021). The seventy-year-old Volkan Bozkır is a veteran diplomat and politician. He served as Minister for European Union Affairs from November 2015 to May 2016 and previously held the same office from August 2014 to August 2015.

At the heels of his UNGA top job election – the first ever Turkish national to strike such a success – Volkan Bozkir visited Pakistan (August 2020). The following year, he paid a second three day long visit to Islamabad (26-28 May 2021) as president of the UNGA.

Erdoğan himself visited Pakistan in February 2020. Addressing the parliament in Islamabad, the Turkish president said the Kashmir issue was as important to Turkey as it was to Pakistan, recalling the help of the Pakistani people during Turkey’s War of Independence and stating that Kashmir would now be the same for Turks.

According to recent Indian intelligence reports the Turkish government has been trying to radicalize Indian Muslims and recruit fundamentalists. “Fronts for the Turkish government or the outfits it supports – some of them directly linked to Erdogan and his family – appeared to have made deeper inroads in India than assessed earlier,” the Hindustan Times reported. Much of the effort is directed via Turkish state media, educational institutes, the nonprofit sector, the NGOs.

The Indian daily reports that “Turkey has been providing lucrative scholarships and running exchange programmes for Indian Kashmiri and Muslim students to study in Turkey through state-sponsored NGOs. Once the students land in Turkey, they are approached and taken over by the Pakistan proxies operating there.” Moreover, Indians “who serve Ankara’s agenda are being sent to Turkey by the embassy on exposure trips and encouraged to speak against India.”

It is highly likely that the Turkish leadership in lending a helping hand to Pakistani claims on Kashmir is expecting the return of the favour by Islamabad on the Cyprus front. Indeed, in international diplomatic corridors, it is rumoured that Pakistan may well be the first country – save for Turkey itself – to establish formal diplomatic relations with the breakaway Turkish Cypriot state.

We need to guard against such a negative development as well as draw the necessary lessons learnt from our failed campaign to get our own top diplomat Andreas Mavroyiannis elected president of the UNGA five years ago in 2016. Though the vote was close – Mavroyiannis lost for only four votes – the fact that he lost to the candidate of Fiji, a light weight in international affairs (who would doubt that?) is telling.

Fast forward four years, we witness the Turks winning the top seat we failed to secure in the biggest global multilateral organization. Incidentally, second largest after the UN, inter-governmental organization, is the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), (formerly Organization of the Islamic Conference) where we do not even have a say whereas Turkey in tandem with Pakistan may exercise much more leverage …

Ο συνάδελφος αναλυτής Κώστας Βενιζέλος απηχώντας ομοίως την πιο πάνω θεώρηση των πραγμάτων, σε πρόσφατο άρθρο του στον «Φ» (24/7/2021), αναφέρεται σε πληροφορίες για επανασύσταση από την Κυπριακή κυβέρνηση δύο επιστροπών [μελετών] του 2007 για τις Βρετανικές Βάσεις. Τον Οκτώβρη του 2016, το άρθρο μας υπό τον τίτλο «Βρετανικές Βάσεις εκ Νέου στο Προσκήνιο» χαρακτήριζε την πολιτική μας απέναντι στις ΒΒ ‘περιστασιακή, αποσπασματική και ασπόνδυλη’. Πέντε σχεδόν χρόνια μετά, δυστυχώς, δικαιωνόμαστε. Θα επανέλθουμε με περισσότερα στοιχεία σε βάθος παρελθόντος χρόνου για την εγκαταληφθείσα διαπραγμάτευση με την Βρετανική κυβέρνηση. Για την ώρα παραθέτουμε το άρθρο του 2016 αυτούσιο:

«Θα έλεγε κανείς ότι η απασχόληση μας ως πολιτεία και δη πλήρες μέλος του ΟΗΕ και της ΕΕ με το θέμα των Βρετανικών Βάσεων (ΒΒ) είναι περιστασιακή, αποσπασματική και ασπόνδυλη. Αντικατοπτρίζει προφανώς τον τρόπο με τον οποίο χαράσσουμε ή ίσως δεν χαράσσουμε καν πολιτική, απλά αντιδρούμε περιστασιακά στις αυθαιρεσίες των όσων έχουν φροντίσει από δεκαετίες βάσει σχεδίου να διαμελίσουν αυτό τον τόπο για να τον κρατούν υπόδουλο προς εύκολη εξυπηρέτηση των συμφερόντων τους.

Έτσι και τώρα βρεθήκαμε για μια ακόμη φορά εν όψει μιας νέας αυθαιρεσίας των Βρετανών οι οποίοι αποφάσισαν και διέταξαν εν κρυπτώ την αποψίλωση του δασυλλίου Ξυλοφάγου επικαλούμενοι λόγους ασφάλειας λόγω παρακείμενου πεδίου βολής αλλά και πατώντας πάνω σε ασύγγνωστη, ανάρμοστη και βάναυση συμπεριφορά σε βάρος αθώων … πτηνών από μέρους μερίδας ασυνείδητων Κυπρίων αγροτών.

Το θέμα των ΒΒ εκτείνεται σε βάθος χρόνου εξηκονταετίας και επεχειρήθη από μέρους των Βρετανών να καταστεί περίπλοκο και δυσεπίλυτο μέσα από την Συνθήκη Εγκαθίδρυσης (ΣΕ) της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας (ΚΔ). Η ΣΕ είναι αυτή κάθε αυτή βεβαρημένη με πολλές σελίδες λεπτομερειακής κατοχύρωσης των δικαιωμάτων πρόσβασης, χρήσης (αν όχι και κατάχρησης) του εδάφους, εναερίου και θαλασσίου χώρου της ΚΔ τόσο εντός όσο και εκτός ΒΒ. (Η τελευταία αναφορά μας παραπέμπει στις διαβόητες περιοχές διακατοχής και άλλες εγκαταστάσεις οι οποίες αποτελούν αναπόσπαστο μέρος της ΣΕ). Οι δεκάδες σελίδες των Παραρτημάτων της ΣΕ καθορίζουν με σαφή τρόπο αυτά τα δικαιώματα. Το ίδιο το κείμενο της ΣΕ στα δώδεκα του άρθρα δίνει το στίγμα της ύπαρξης της Συνθήκης ως διακρατικής συμφωνίας διασφάλισης της μονιμότητας της Βρετανικής στρατιωτικής παρουσίας επί της νήσου.

Η εξασφάλιση άτεγκτων όρων μόνιμης Βρετανικής στρατιωτικής παρουσίας στη νήσο μας γίνεται με ένα κεκαλυμμένο και ύπουλο θα έλεγε κανείς τρόπο. Από την μια αναφέρεται στην ΣΕ ότι δεν είναι πρόθεση του Ηνωμένου Βασιλείου να ιδρύσει ‘κράτος εν κράτει’ έχοντας εξασφαλίσει την παρουσία των Βάσεων του στο διηνεκές. Από την άλλη όμως, η δεδηλωμένη άρνηση τέτοιας πρόθεσης αυτομάτως αναιρείται από την φύση και την δομή την οποία οι Βρετανοί επιδίωξαν να δώσουν στις Βάσεις τους. Τις ονόμασαν και τις δόμησαν ως ‘κυρίαρχες’. Ο όρος ‘κυρίαρχος’ αποδίδεται μόνο σε κρατικές οντότητες. Αν και κατά το γράμμα της ΣΕ οι ΒΒ δεν αποτελούν κράτος, επιδιώκεται κατ’ ουσίαν, να είναι μέσα από την λειτουργία μιας ολοκληρωμένης κρατικής διοίκησης η οποία εμπερικλείεται στην όλη δομή της ούτω καλούμενης Διοίκησης των Κυριάρχων Περιοχών Βάσεων – ΔΚΠΒ.

Έτσι η ‘ΔΚΠΒ’ διαθέτει Πολιτικό Διοικητή (πέραν του Στρατιωτικού), Αστυνομία, Δικαστήρια, Ακτοφυλακή και Τελωνεία. Δεν διαθέτει, βέβαια, Υπουργικό Συμβούλιο διότι υπεύθυνη για την χάραξη πολιτικής είναι η κυβέρνηση του Λονδίνου και οι καθ’ ύλην αρμόδιοι Υπουργοί της, ‘Αμυνας και Εξωτερικών. Μολαταύτα γίνεται αντιληπτό ότι οι Βρετανοί δια της εγκαθιδρύσεως καθορισμένων Περιοχών Βάσεων, από το 1959 και έκτοτε, έχουν προσδώσει και διατηρήσει απαράλλακτες κρατικές δομές στις Περιοχές των Βάσεων τους. Η ‘ΔΚΠΒ’ είναι δηλαδή στην πράξη προτεκτοράτο του Ηνωμένου Βασιλείου. Άλλωστε οι ίδιοι οι Βρετανοί ονομάζουν την διοίκηση αυτή και λοιπά άλλα απομεινάρια της άλλωτε κραταιάς τους Αυτοκρατορίας (δεκαεπτά στο σύνολο), ‘υπερπόντιες εξαρτώμενες περιοχές’.

Το ζήτημα των ηθικών, οικονομικών αλλά και ιστορικών ευθυνών των Βρετανών για το παραστράτημα από την οδό της εφαρμογής της γνήσιας αυτοδιάθεσης στην περίπτωση της Κύπρου είναι τεράστιο.

Στο παρών σύντομο σημείωμα αρκεί να αναφέρουμε ότι η πρόθεση των Βρετανών να συνδράμουν οικονομικά την ΚΔ ως αντίδωρο στην απρόσκοπτη λειτουργία των Βάσεων τους – η οποία κατά καιρούς μπορεί να μην συμπίπτει με τα καλώς νοούμενα Κυπριακά συμφέροντα –  έχει παραμείνει γράμμα κενό εδώ και πενήντα τρία χρόνια.

Καταλήγοντας να ευχαριστήσουμε την εφημερίδα Ο Φιλελεύθερος για την δημοσίευση των συντετμημένων αναλύσεων μας και να υπενθυμίσουμε ότι άρθρο της αρχισυνταξίας επί του θέματος, εννέα χρόνια πριν (Οκτώβριος 2007), υπό τον τίτλο Το Δεύτερο Μέτωπο Έχει Ήδη Ανοίξει κατέληγε με την εξής σοφή φράση: όπως υποδείξαμε πολλές φορές, δεν θα ανοίξουμε δεύτερο μέτωπο γιατί από δεκαετίες αυτό υπάρχει ως Βρετανική επιλογή.»

Much as there can be personal likes or dislikes between world leaders there is one prime factor that determines the level of bilateral relations between countries: this is the convergence or divergence of political and economic interests.

Harping on medieval history, the Turks claim that their Ottoman ancestors gave the French ‘the most privileged state’ status under the terms of capitulations as early as 1535. The same year, the French dispatched Jean de la Forest as their first ambassador to Constantinople. Nevertheless, it took almost two hundred years for the Ottomans to reciprocate with sending their own envoy to Paris: The Ottoman Empire government appointed its first ambassador Yirmisekiz Mehmet Çelebi to France in 1721.

Nowadays, economic relations between the two countries are not insignificant. Currently 1.366 French companies are operating in Turkey. France ranks 10th country in terms of number of foreign companies operating in Turkey. In the years 2002-2015, French direct investments to Turkey have reached 6.759 billion US dollars. France ranks 10th in terms of foreign direct investments.

Beyond trade, Erdogan envisions the biggest role for Turkey: to become the region’s ‘law and order provider’. “There are also measures that we can take together … against terrorist organisations” Erdogan told Macron at the said videocall (2 March 2021), insinuating at his fervent desire to eliminate the PKK freedom fighters. The Turkish President added that Turkey and France ‘can contribute significantly to stability and peace in Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and Africa’.

However, in practical terms Erdogan offered nothing: he did not mention anything on the fate of more than a dozen French teachers at Istanbul’s Galatasaray University whose work permits have been held up and who face the threat of expulsion due to last year’s diplomatic spat.

Recently, the Turkish leadership has been uttering some conciliatory words towards the EU in view of the latter’s summit later in the month. The European Council meeting is due to discuss further sanctions on Turkey as a reaction to Ankara’s provocative exploration moves in Greek and Cypriot waters. Such a big decision was postponed  at the last European Council meeting (10-11 December 2020). Erdogan’s overture to Macron targets at weaning France from the hardline ‘in-favour-of-sanctions club’ where Greece and Cyprus stand and placing it within the moderates’ camp where Germany, Italy and Spain exhibit reluctance on the prospect of further antagonizing Turkey. The latter block’s cautionary stance has been explained by their significant commercial interests in Turkey and its anticipation that any measures leading to a Turkish economic crisis would, in turn, severely harm the European banking sector.

To be sure, sanctions or no sanctions, the Turkish leadership has over the last few years shown excessive zeal in promoting an assertive and expansionist foreign policy aimed at establishing a regional Pax Turca in the entire region that Erdogan mentioned in his videocall to Macron. It is highly unlikely that it will back down, for whatever reason, from this long-term goal.

The normalization of relations between Morocco and Israel came in with the United States agreeing to legitimize Morocco’s annexation of Spanish Sahara, a territory which had been vacated by Spain in 1976, something that Rabat had been seeking for a long time regardless of the opposition of the Organization of African Unity and ostensibly against international law and precedent. Trump was able to convince Arab parties to recognize Israel by promising arms and foreign aid, more importantly, opposition to Iran and its nuclear policies gave Washington even more psychological leverage amongst conservative Arab states.

There were a series of factors which allowed President Trump to seize the moment and achieve these diplomatic breakthroughs which contributed to the changing balance of power in the Middle East. These developments had not been expected and did not receive the deserved attention in terms of power shifts in the region and in the international system. Such an evolution will be seen in the context of an increasing shift away from the use of fossil fuels, specifically oil and coal, and an increasing trend towards renewable energy, ranging from solar power to hydrogen power, and as many expected, advanced nuclear power, with a possible move towards nuclear fusion. An indicator of these trends was the realization on the part of some Middle Eastern powers that their possession of oil reserves was not guarantee for future economic wellbeing and security. Thus, confrontation and war with the Jewish state and support for the Palestinian cause had become an ever greater liability for the future of political and economic wellbeing of many states, ranging from Africa to the Persian Gulf.

The trend away from fossil fuel was and is being further highlighted by the concerns over climate change and the policies that states will follow to mitigate the effect of climate change and global warming. Indeed, one crucial concern in the financial world, for example, was the role of the insurance and reinsurance companies in planning new insurance policies and possibly high premiums for catastrophes, fires and severe weather storms such as hurricanes. These trends inevitably influencing the corporations whose profits derive from investments in economic enterprises connected to the energy sector, ranging from oil refining to coal powered power plants, the plastic industry, the automotive industry, air transportation, shipping, and tourism. Areas of interest for alternative and renewable energy sources range from solar power, hydrogen power, nuclear power through both fusion and fission, and eolic power.

The consequences of such a shift for the financial institutions and investment banks, and most importantly for pension funds, are difficult to fathom. In analogous terms, the consequences for international power relations become ever more problematic for forecasting international security trends and future balances of regional and global power. The breakthrough of the Trump Administration in brokering peace agreements in the Middle East is an indicator of how decision makers in Washington crafted US security policies in the Middle East and the Mediterranean to further American interests. Traditionally, as John Kerry and the Obama Administration had kept harping on, there was a constant focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict and how failure to resolve the Palestinian – Israel conflict would block peace from being reached in the region. Indeed, the success and appeal of Iran in the area owed much to its fanatic opposition to the Jewish state and its support for the Palestinian cause. As it was, it turned out that given the trends in the Arab world, the Palestinians could not now veto peaceful relations between Arab states and Jerusalem. The Saudi state did not object to these developments and its role as the guardian of Islamic holy sites, its control over huge petroleum resources, and foreign exchange allowed Saudi rulers to indirectly promote Israeli-Gulf cooperation.

The trend away from the use of fossil fuels is taking place, paradoxically, when Turkey is challenging many of its neighbors for control over oil and gas production in the Mediterranean while truculently threatening Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, France, and the European Union. In fact, Erdogan, at the United Nations was denouncing Trump and the United States, along with Israel in virtually anti-Semitic terms in his promotion of Palestinian rights and independence. Ankara was meanwhile moving arms, mercenaries and advisors into Libya while claiming rights over large swaths of the Mediterranean Sea. The Turkish moves in the Mideast and North Africa were matched by an increasing Russian military and political presence in the region, highlighted by Moscow’s military presence in Syria, and an ever larger navy in the Mediterranean. Trends in the Middle East and Persian Gulf also witnessed an ever increasing interest in Chinese investments, especially in the case of Iran, where the Ayatollahs were enticing Beijing in return for oil, gas, and financial backing of the Iranian economy with the hope of blocking American influence in the Gulf. Peace trends were being paradoxically strengthened by the ever increasing fear on the part of Arab States of Iranian Shiite imperial ambitions that saw a very successful manipulation and control of paramilitary organizations controlled by Iranian officers and the revolutionary guard in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, the Gaza Strip, Yemen, and very likely in some African States as Islamic radicalism spread throughout East and West Africa.

As the Gulf saw conservative Sunni Arab States reassess their relations and past confrontations with the state of Israel, the diplomatic breakthroughs were an indicator of shifts in the balance of power in the area as Turkey and Iran were articulating nationalist neo-Islamist ideologies generated by Khomeini’s Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. In the 20th Century, the region’s preeminence from West Asia to North Africa was connected to international demand for oil and gas. From the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf, to Libya and Algeria, oil and gas became one of the central themes in international conflict and cooperation with oil producing states manipulating the price of oil. Geology gave these states in the Middle East and North Africa an incredible leverage in extracting concessions both economically and politically from Europe and the United States. However, by 2020, concern about climate change and the increasing CO2 emissions, convinced all nations of the necessity for decreasing the use of fossil fuels and to seek alternatives in renewable energy or nuclear power.

The economic shifts in the evolution of energy alternatives were inevitably shaping the economic evolution of the international system. Leaders of Gulf States, as well as other oil producing nations such as Norway, realized that the demand for advanced technology and scientific research was now as important as the financial resources that had been accumulated in the last two generations. The trend toward peace treaties was structurally driven. Thus, ideology was now taking a more secondary seat in the political calculations of the leadership in the Arab and Islamic world. All the same, it had been inevitable that for some countries ideological considerations did not lose their primary role in their foreign policies, as in the case of Turkey and Iran. By September of 2020, Ankara had goaded Azerbaijan to go to war with Armenia as a conflict between the two Caucasian countries would have enhanced the neo-Ottoman ambitions of Erdogan’s Turkey. Some of Erdogan’s statements were already causing apprehensions in Tehran as he implied by the end of 2020 in Baku that Iranian Azerbaijan, with a Turkish-speaking population, was part of the greater Turkey that Erdogan was envisioning.

Iranian Shi’ite ideology was not to be underestimated in Tehran’s policies as the Ayatollahs’ aggressive moves within the Arab and Islamic world were rationalized in terms of defending Islam and Shiism. Trends in the Gulf toward more peaceful relations with Israel and more cooperation with the United States were ever more motivated by anxiety and fear about Iranian political ambitions. Turkey’s own imperial moves in North Africa, the Caucasus, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria and Turkish vocal and truculent support for Palestine as it denounced “Zionism” were again indicators of historical ideological motivations that were provoking anxieties in many Arab countries, particularly Egypt, the most important Arab country. Erdogan’s cooptation of the Muslim Brothers, an organization dedicated to Pan-Islamism, and by now based in Turkey after fleeing Egypt, was not to be underestimated. The Muslim Brothers were very influential in Tunisia, Morocco, Qatar and they were supported even by the Iranian Mullahs, regardless of their historical aversion towards Sunnis.

The trends toward new configurations of power relations in the region and in the Mediterranean had been made strategically possible by the fact that in the United States and Canada, more oil and gas was being produced than ever before, and the United States was not dependent on oil imports as the case had been in the 1970s and 1980s. If anything, the US could be an alternative to Europe and Japan for oil and gas. President Trump tried to pressure but failed to convince Germany to abandon the construction of gas pipelines from Russia, offering American gas via maritime routes.

The ever increasing surplus of oil and gas in the world was decreasing the economic power of many states, not only in the Middle East but also in states such as Mexico, Venezuela, Angola and Nigeria, a trend that was enhanced by the discovery of new fossil fuel deposits in the world. In the Mediterranean, the discovery of gas and oil deposits in the territorial waters of Israel, Cyprus, and Egypt saw increasing cooperation in building sea pipelines to carry gas through Europe. Cooperation was brought forward amongst gas producing states within an International Organization, including, Cyprus, Israel, Palestine, Greece, Italy and Jordan.

What stands out in terms of the historical developments shaping the international system is European Union’s inability and certainly Germany to have a role in promoting peaceful developments in the area. Even the much vaunted role of China in the international system does not see a comparable Chinese involvement in promoting peaceful trends in the area. As it is, the international system relies –as always- on Washington and Moscow with the contributions of Paris and London in promoting a more stable Middle East. That is to say historically the role of the Great Powers that had shaped the Middle East in modern time is not declining. Trump had indeed reasserted American power in the wake of Obama’s failure to resolve some of the more outstanding conflicts of the Middle East. The evolving shift away from the use of fossil fuels has been matched by a reassertion to Great Power politics echoing the developments of European 19th Century history, as Imperial Russia, Great Britain and France competed for hegemony over the territories of a declining Ottoman Empire. The paradox now is that Erdogan’s Turkey has become a revisionist power trying to reassert a historical role more consonant with Ottoman history and reflecting a virulent Turko-Islamic nationalism.

National and international rhetoric about climate change, human rights and the more progressive world has not necessarily impacted on international power politics whilst the arms race in the Middle East, South Asia and the Pacific were and continue to be harbingers of new political scenarios. Realism and idealism continue to shape international diplomatic activity, national rhetoric and political ideologies regardless of the fact that the Covid-19 virus did have an impact on slowing down diplomatic interaction and that climate change rhetoric appealed to more active political parties in Western countries.

The successful diplomatic activity of the Trump administration which has begun in 2017 with Trump’s visit to the area and Washington’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, triggered the chain of developments that brought more Arab States to recognize Israel. In turn, the expansion of alternatives to fossil fuels, the fear of climate change and new developments in mass communications and artificial intelligence portend to be the harbingers of structural changes in the international political economy.

The Western alliance launched the air attack campaign which lasted for 79 days and nights – it started on 24 March 1999 – without the due authorisation by the UN Security Council. Obviously, the unauthorised air raids were in direct breach of international law: NATO was not in any conceivable way threatened by the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) to warrant a self-defence response.

‘Humanitarian intervention’ was NATO’s brand name for the massive air raid on the rump FRY. The Brussels headquartered alliance referred to the protection of the Albanian minority – residing mostly in Kosovo – from the federal Yugoslav army ‘onslaught’. But how humanitarian was NATO’s intervention? Here are the ‘humanitarian effects’ of the almost three-month long air raids: between 489 and 528 civilians killed on top of about one thousand members of the Yugoslav Security Forces. The bombings destroyed or damaged bridges, industrial plants, hospitals, schools, cultural monuments, private businesses as well as barracks and military installations. Modest estimates put the value of the immediate material damage inflicted at around $35 billion. This figure does not include the tremendous loss of future production capacity as a result of the obliteration of the country’s industrial base by NATO’s bomber jets. Twenty one years later, NATO has not compensated a single billion for this immense catastrophe. (Interested in learning excruciating details of this untold story? Browse the book entitled Crime in War, Genocide in Peace: The Consequences of NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 authored by three professors: Vladislav Jovanovic, Slobodan Petkovic & Slobodan Cikaric, www.slglasnik.com, Belgrade 2012).

A single extract from the afore-mentioned book would suffice (pp. 14-15):

Regrettably, it was not only that political and military leaders of the major NATO Members were absolutely unscrupulous in committing aggression … but they also totally disregarded their moral duty following the aggression, to provide assistance in the identification and rehabilitation of the contaminated areas, funding for overcoming the created [sad] situation and compensation to the victims or their families for their loss, traumatic experience and covering of medical treatment expenses. Instead of showing at least minimum solidarity with the innocent victims, NATO leaders are watching quite indifferently, from the heights of their invulnerability, how Russian experts specializing in demining and decontamination are assisting, at their own cost, the clearance of some contaminated areas. (Vladislav Jovanovic: NATO Aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Depleted Uranium)

As it happens Russian humanitarian aid to Serbia is not a desultory affair: early in April of the current year, the Russian Ministry of Defence dispatched 87 military virologists and doctors, special and protective equipment as well as sixteen pieces of military equipment to assist in the fight against coronavirus. The aid warranted eleven Il-76 flights to Serbia. Two Russian medical teams stayed on in the Serbian capital, where the most difficult epidemiological situation has developed, whilst five more were sent to the cities of Nis, Kikinda, Valevo and Chupria. President Vucic, whose party opposes NATO membership, thanked the Russian president, for volunteering this valuable aid at the height of the Covid-19 lock down.

Next Sunday, June 21^st, Serbia goes to the polls. The country’s future relations with NATO form part of these general elections’ foreign and defence policy agenda on which the battle for power is fought. Belgrade has a twenty-one year old unsettled bill in US dollars – undoubtedly an eleven digit figure – to claim from the unscrupulous Western alliance.

In less than a year time (May 2021) the Cypriot voters will also go to the polls for parliamentary elections. The island republic’s relations with NATO has also been part of the Cypriot national debate. The issue is complex; equally historically loaded. It was NATO-member Turkey which invaded Cyprus in 1974 using NATO weaponry. The US arms sales embargo imposed on Turkey in the aftermath of the invasion was so short-lived that amounted to a mockery. Like in the case of NATO air strikes on Serbia, Ankara failed to pay the billions in compensation for damages and war crimes committed by its invading troops in Cyprus. Not to mention NATO’s complete failure to reign in Turkish continuous trouble making in the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. So much so that an exacerbated French Ministry of Defence had to put out a no-word-mincing statement: there is a Turkey time bomb within NATO, let’s face it, otherwise we fool ourselves!                                            

By 2020, the confrontation between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean and in the Mediterranean at large, saw the Greek Minister of Defense speak about possibility of military conflict with Turkey.(i) This statement by the Greek Minister of Defense came a few hours after the Turkish President held a press conference in Ankara with Fayez Al Sarraj, Prime Minister of the UN-recognized National Accord Government based in the Libyan capital of Tripoli.(ii) Erdoğan said that Turkey and Libya would proceed with oil exploration and drilling in Greece’s contested maritime space in the eastern Mediterranean(iii), adjacent to Crete and now claimed by Libya aided and abetted by Ankara as it kept challenging Athens. Turkey had begun its military and political involvement in the civil war in Libya while confronting the Saudi, Emirati and Egyptian involvement in North Africa against a Turkish presence and the ideological influence of the Muslim brothers and manipulated by Erdoğan’s Islamist ideology. Just a few weeks earlier, there had been confrontations between Greek and Turkish forces on the border in Thrace.(iv) Thousands and thousands of real and imaginary refugees and other irregular migrants from the Middle East at large, including Afghanistan and Pakistan, moved to Turkey and planned on entering Europe. Having encouraged them to move to the Greek border, Ankara is seeking to entice those manipulated unfortunate souls to step into the European Union. In its confrontation in Cyprus, Turkey paved over the entry point in northern Cyprus in favor of entering the republic to the south.

Some years earlier, the war in Syria had seen thousands of refugees going to primarily Germany and Sweden. This development gave Erdoğan a chance to blackmail Europe to receive aid and status recognition and drawing concessions regarding Ankara’s relations with the European Union. For decades, Turkey had tried to be admitted into the European club. The EU, in trying to avoid conflict with Turkey, had already admitted Greece in 1980 and promised future admission to Turkey as to avoid conflicts in the area. Both Athens and Ankara have been long standing members of NATO but that membership has not lessened the confrontation between the two countries. Neither has it mitigated Turkey’s contemporary attempt to revise power relations with its Greek neighbor.

The Arab-Israeli conundrum receives the bulk of interest in Europe and North America, and of course the Islamic world, as the Jewish state’s legitimacy has always been challenged at some level or another. The European, and especially Italian relations to North Africa and the Middle East and inevitably to Mediterranean security have been historically linked in the mind of the European public and political parties to the wars between Israel and its neighbors. What are overlooked in the European political world are the other conflicts in the Middle East. For example, the partition of Cyprus, the confrontation between Turkish and Greek worlds which overlaps with contentious maritime borders, potentially rich with oil and gas in the Aegean Sea and off the shores of Cyprus. Sectarian conflicts in the Middle East are also relevant, as Shii, Sunnis and other radical Islamists in the Sunni world challenge the social fabric and political systems of individual states such as Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria.

Italy with specific strategic interests is, arguably, the European country with the most important role in the Mediterranean. The fall of Gadhafi in 2011 after an internal revolt aided and abetted by France and other powers against the desires of the Italian government brought a power vacuum that allowed hundreds of thousands of African, Middle Eastern and Asian illegal immigrants moving successfully to the European continent through Italy. The Syrian civil war added even more impetus to these catastrophic migrations that have brought the European Union to a point of delegitimization in the eyes of many European citizens. In the recent past, the government of Silvio Berlusconi, had been successful in supporting the Gadhafi regime so as to stop illegal immigration in exchange for Italian development aid and of course purchase of Libyan oil.

Historically Italy’s main state-owned oil company, Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi, ENI, successfully entered the international oil and gas markets from the 1960s onward. Its total revenues never matched those of companies such as Exxon, Royal Dutch Shell, Total or British Petroleum (BP); all the same, the company itself came to play a big role in Italian daily and political life. It does so to this day. It serves Italian strategic needs very well. The Italian gas and oil markets have always been characterized by long term national policies, because of the vulnerable economic position of Italy as it lacks natural resources. Following the Chernobyl disaster, Italy did away with nuclear energy in the 1980s. In this regard, the rhetoric about renewable energy in the country has not been matched by policies. By 2019, ENI was drilling offshore Cyprus for gas and oil, challenged by Turkey.(v) In early 2020, both Italian ENI and French energy giant Total announced the suspension of their drilling programme in Cyprus waters allegedly because of the corona virus crisis. However, not a few are those who believe that the real reason is the Turkish bullying.

The energy power game was also seeing at this time the entry of another player, Israel, with the plan to build a gas pipeline from the Israeli controlled seabed in the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe via Cyprus and Greece. The East Med pipeline has already received European support with the European Commission designating it as a project of common interest.

As in many European nations, Italy relies heavily on revenues derived from the taxation of energy consumption and highway tolls. The Italian transportation industry has been faced with a lot of challenges and its contribution to environmental degradation and pollution is not to be underestimated. In the last decade, the government has pushed forward policies to motivate the population to purchase more environmentally sound cars. However, it looks like it will take some generations before the adoption of non-polluting cars. All the same, Middle Eastern conflicts have influenced the price of oil in markets all over the world, and have been exploited politically by states in conflict such as Iran vs Saudi Arabia. As many oil producing nations encounter political problems, such as those in Venezuela, industrially advanced states – Italy is one of them – have to be very careful about managing and resolving international conflict. International conflict and instability in the eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea present a challenge to any Italian government and even to the military organization to which Rome belongs, in this case, NATO. The politics of oil and gas, became less problematic as by 2020, the price of these commodities had collapsed in the international market while the United States had become the largest producer of oil. But in no way did this relatively positive development lessened the need for alternatives to fossil fuels for environmental considerations.

Whilst Turkey and Greece are members of NATO, the policies of the current Turkish government continue to be very confrontational toward Athens and Nicosia. Current relations between Washington and Ankara are becoming ever more problematic because of overlapping conflicts in the Mideast such as the Syrian civil war, the confrontation between Israel and its Arab neighbors and the rise of the Islamic State. A development that took important political significance was the acquisition of Russian anti-aircraft missiles S400 by Ankara over and above the objections of Washington.

Turkey’s acquisition of sophisticated Russian military hardware was, by 2020, an indicator of a successful Russian re-entry into the politics of the area, after the demise of the Soviet Union, as Moscow’s involvement into the Syrian and Libyan civil wars foreshadowed another chapter in the great power conflicts in the Mediterranean. While the United States, under the presidency of Donald Trump, had stated that the US administration was committed to withdraw from conflicts in the area, the reality on the ground showed that the US was still heavily involved in the security of the region. Among other reasons, was the decades old confrontation between Iran and the United States as the radical Mullahs of Tehran had successfully entered the Near-East, especially Iraq and Syria, directly challenging US interests in the area, threatening Israel with genocide and challenging very subtly both Russia and Turkey for hegemony in the region. (vi) In fact, by 2020, American military commanders involved in anti-Islamic terrorism campaign in Africa (vii) were mentioning the possibility and inclination toward an American involvement in Tunisia as its border with Libya was becoming even more challenging for international security.(viii)

The great power game was already witnessing the entry of China in the region through Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative that saw, on paper, a revival of the Silk Road and the systematic expansion of Beijing’s commercial interests in Africa, the Middle East and Europe.(ix) The entry of China added an ever greater dimension to the theory of the balance of power in the study of international relations. If anything, it confirmed and strengthened the ideas of neo-realism in international affairs and challenged idealism and globalization as harbingers of peace and conflict resolution in the world. What stood out was the inability of Italy to act as a great power in the Mediterranean and even more the European Union as its policies for peace and cooperation seemed to be totally irrelevant to the power conflicts in the region.

(i) Paul Antonopoulos, “Greek Defense Minister: Turkey’s behavior is aggressive but our powerful Armed Forces are deterrent,” Greek City Times, June 5th, 2020, https://greekcitytimes.com/2020/06/05/greek-defence-minister- turkeys-behaviour-is-aggressive-but-our-powerful-armed-forces-is-a-deterrent/.
(ii) Ibid.
(iii) Ibid.
(iv) Steven Brown, “Tensions soar as Turkish troops invade Greece occupying piece of land on contested border” Express, May 22, 2020, https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1285915/turkey-Greece-invade-contested-border- world-war-3-latest-ww3-news.
(v) “Our work in Cyprus,” ENI, https://www.eni.com/en-IT/global-presence/eurasia/cyprus.html.
(vi) Sina Azodi and Giorgio Cafiero, “Idlib is a stress test for Iranian-Turkish relations,” Atlantic Council, March 17, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/idlib-is-a-stress-test-for-iranian-turkish-relations/.
(vii) U.S. Army Africa Public Affairs, “USARAF commander engages Tunisian Land Forces army chief,” United States Army Africa, May 13, 2020, https://www.usaraf.army.mil/media-room/pressrelease/29481/usaraf- commander-engages-tunisian-land-forces-army-chief.
(viii) Jared Szuba, “US commander suggests sending military trainers to Tunisia after Russia sends aircraft to Libya,” Al-Monitor, June 1, 2020, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/06/us-commander-send-military- trainers-tunisia-russia-libya.html.
(ix) Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, “China’s massive Belt and Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 28, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative.